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NOTE
Not in My Womb: Compelled Prenatal
Genetic Testing
By WENDY E. RooP*
I. Introduction
Fueled by advances in genetic research, medical technology is
progressing by leaps and bounds. Genetic information made available
by the Human Genome Project has enabled physicians to trace the
genetic roots of physical and mental disorders. Genetic testing is now
a part of routine prenatal care. Fetal gene therapy is expected to pro-
vide even more treatment options in the near future. Moreover, fetal
surgery can correct some genetic defects in utero. These extraordi-
nary developments are quickly outpacing corresponding legal prece-
dent. As the availability and level of prenatal care continues to
expand, troubling questions arise regarding what constitutes "routine"
care. When considered in context with the current imbroglio sur-
rounding abortion and numerous forced caesarean cases, one wonders
whether women might ever be compelled to submit to mandatory pre-
natal genetic testing.
This Note examines various issues raised by the ongoing develop-
ment of prenatal genetic testing and concludes that states cannot com-
pel women to undergo prenatal genetic testing. Section II lays the
groundwork by reviewing key medical and genetic processes essential
to understanding the complexity of the issues involved. Section III
evaluates the current status of prenatal genetic testing and how such
testing is affected by the availability of both genetic treatment and
abortion. Section IV questions whether states' police power is suffi-
cient to impose unwanted treatment on pregnant women. After con-
sideration of several arguments the answer is clear. Mandatory
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prenatal genetic testing is not an effective way to further states' argua-
bly compelling interest in preventing disease and protecting potential
life. Section V discusses women's important fundamental rights that
would be violated by state mandated prenatal testing. Finally, Section
VI concludes by suggesting a program of voluntary testing. The solu-
tion relies on the doctrines of beneficence and autonomy, which to-
gether render coercive legislation moot in all but the most unusual
circumstances.
H. Understanding the Fundamentals
A. Why Genetics Is Important
The amazing sequence of events that occurs during pregnancy is
truly miraculous. A brief overview of the unseen genetic process
leads to a keen appreciation of fetal developments often taken for
granted. Every cell in the human body, except sperm cells and egg
cells, has forty-six chromosomes.1 Sperm cells and egg cells have only
twenty-three.2 When a sperm and egg join together, the resulting em-
bryo has forty-six chromosomes.3 In this manner, the embryo ac-
quires half of its genetic material from each parent.4
The forty-six chromosomes are arranged in twenty-three num-
bered pairs.5 Twenty-two of the pairs are called autosomes; they mir-
ror each other in size and shape.6 The twenty-third pair are the sex
chromosomes, X and Y. Unlike autosomes, the sex chromosomes can
be different from each other.7 An egg cell always carries an X chro-
mosome. A sperm cell carries either an X or a Y chromosome.8 Thus,
the twenty-third pair consists of either XX (female) or XY (male),
depending on whether the sperm contributed an X or Y
chromosome.
9
Chromosomes are made up of as many as 100,000 genes, 10 which
in turn are made of spiraling strands of deoxyribonucleic acid
1. See generally ELENA 0. NIGHTINGALE, M.D. & MELISSA GOODMAN, BEFORE
BIRTH: PRENATAL TESTING FOR GENETIc DISEASE 11-26 (1990) [hereinafter NIGrTIN-
GALE & GOODMAN].
2. See id at 11.
3. See id.
4. See id.





10. See id- at 15.
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(DNA)." DNA is sequenced in groups of three which form the code
for the body's twenty essential amino acids. 2 Amino acids are the
building blocks of protein.13 Proteins become enzymes which are nec-
essary for the metabolic processes in the body.'4 If even one enzyme
is missing or is defective drastic effects can ensue.' 5
B. The Human Genome Project
The Human Genome Project has had a significant impact on the
development of prenatal genetic testing. Initiated in October 1990,
the genome project is an international research effort with a two pro-
nged goal: discovering the estimated 60,000 to 100,000 human genes,
and mapping the genes onto each chromosome.' 6 At this time, over
7,000 genes have been traced to specific chromosomes. 7 The Project
is intended to provide researchers with the genetic information
needed to locate the genes responsible for various genetic disorders.' 8
Currently, scientists are using this information to detect and treat ge-
netic disease. Ultimately, the emphasis is anticipated to shift from dis-
ease treatment to disease prevention.' 9
Research from the Human Genome Project has led to the devel-
opment of gene testing and, subsequently, to questions as to whether
and when such testing is appropriate. Gene testing enables physicians
to test for certain genetic disorders by directly examining a patient's
DNA microscopically, or testing for the presence of gene products
(enzymes or other proteins).2 ° The tests can be used for newborn
screening, prenatal testing, and to determine carrier status for
adults.2 ' DNA based tests are currently available for many diseases,
including Alzheimer's disease, cystic fibrosis, duchenne muscular dys-
11. See id. at 19.
12. See id. at 21.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 15.
15. See id, at 16. The single gene disorder called phenylketonuria (PKU) is cited as an
example. This disease is characterized by a deficiency in the enzyme phenylalanine
hydroxylase which cannot function normally. This causes a build up of the amino acid
phenylalanine in the body, and results in brain damage if not quickly detected and treated.
See id.






21. See id. Gene testing for adults is often performed when an adult with a family
history of genetic disease is considering whether to have a child.
400 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27:397
trophy, hemophilia A and B, Huntington disease, phenylketonuria,
sickle cell disease and Tay-Sachs disease.22 The availability of these
tests raises difficult questions however, due to the limited treatment
options for many of these diseases and the uncertainty in interpreting
test results.23
The ethical and societal questions raised by genetic research are
an integral component of the Human Genome Project. In recognition
of this fact, three to five percent of the Project's budget is allocated to
a program dedicated to ethical, legal, and social issues (ELSI).24 ELSI
studies such issues as the psychological impact of genetic differences,
privacy and confidentiality of genetic information, and when and why
testing should be performed. 5 Curiously, one of ELSI's enumerated
goals is to "[f]oster greater acceptance of human genetic variation.
26
This aim appears somewhat incongruous since much of the research
developed by the Human Genome Project has been directed towards
alleviating undesirable genetic traits.
C. Methods of Prenatal Genetic Testing
Although there are many methods of prenatal genetic testing, no
test can detect every genetic defect, and none are one hundred per-
cent accurate. Each test has its own benefits and drawbacks. Not
every test will be appropriate for every patient. For these reasons,
tests are often used in conjunction with one another to confirm or
clarify results. A physician must carefully consider the needs and
characteristics of each patient before recommending one test or a se-
ries of genetic tests.
1. Alpha-Fetoprotein Test
The alpha-fetoprotein (AFP) test is a threshold test designed to
indicate the presence of neural tube defects, such as anencephaly or
spina bifida.27 The test is performed during the second trimester of
pregnancy and measures maternal blood for elevated levels of AFP.28
If the blood test is normal, no further testing is done for neural tube
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Human Genome Project Information: Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues (ELSI)




27. See NIGHTINGALE & GOODMAN, supra note 1, at 28-31.
28. See id. at 29.
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defects.2 9 If the results are high, then subsequent tests are necessary
for two reasons. First it is no simple task to ascertain what levels of
ATP are within normal range.30 Second, neural tube defects are not
the only causes of elevated AFP levels."' Before proceeding with ad-
ditional tests, it is important to inform the mother that elevated levels
of AFP may be the result of carrying more than one fetus, or an inac-
curately calculated date of conception. 2
The AFP test is helpful in diagnosing the presence of neural tube
defects, but as noted, the results cannot guarantee the presence or
absence of a disorder. According to the California Department of
Health Services, AFP testing identifies eighty percent of neural tube
defects.3 3 As this study indicates, a woman who is deeply concerned
about the presence of a neural tube defect will opt for a second test,
regardless of the first result, since a positive result must be confirmed,
and a negative result has a significant chance of being inaccurate. The
potential for confusion and anxiety in interpreting AFP test results
has spurred some debate as to whether the test should be a routine
component of prenatal care. 4
2. Ultrasound
An ultrasound test is not a genetic test per se, but it is often uti-
lized to clarify the results of an AFP test.35 Ultrasonography entails
passing sound waves through the uterus to create an image. An ultra-
sound image enables a physician to visualize the fetus, identify detect-
able deformities, and explain ambiguous test results.36 If more than
one fetus is in the womb it will be readily apparent to the examining





33. See id. at 30.
34. See id. California has mandated that physicians offer AFP testing as a standard
component of prenatal care. See Nancy Anne Press & Carole H. Browner, Collective Si-
lences, Collective Fictions: How Prenatal Diagnostic Testing Became Part of Routine Prena-
tal Care, in WOMEN AND PRENATAL TESTING: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF GENETIC
TECHNOLOGY 201, 202 (Karen H. Rothenberg & Elizabeth J. Thomson eds., 1994) [herein-
after FACING THE CHALLENGES].
In addition to AFP testing, California has mandated that other tests must also be offered,
such as HIV, rubella and fetal blood type. Telephone Interview with Kirk A. Keegan, Jr.,
M.D., Dean of Continuing Medical Education, Vice-Chair of the Department of Obstetrics
& Gynecology, University of California at Irvine (Dec. 1, 1998).
35. See NIGHTiNGALE & GOODMAN, supra note 1, at 31.
36. See id.
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ception is accurat6 by assessing the size of the fetus.3 7 An ultrasound
test can be performed at any time, and is the least invasive technique
for determining fetal health. Its utility in detecting disorders, how-




Amniocentesis may also be used either in conjunction with an
AFP test, or independently to test for other disorders.3 9 To perform
an amniocentesis, a physician withdraws a sample of amniotic fluid via
a needle inserted through the mother's abdominal wall and into the
womb.4 0 Often, an ultrasound is performed simultaneously to allow
the physician to see the needle and to reduce the possibility of punc-
turing the placenta or injuring the fetus.41 Analysis of the amniotic
fluid can detect abnormalities in several ways. Genetic testing of fetal
cells present in amniotic fluid can be performed, the levels of specific
substances in the amniotic fluid can be measured, and fetal chromo-
somes can be karotyped (a procedure in which chromosomes are
stained and examined).42
Amniocentesis generally provides reliable results, however it has
notable drawbacks. Most significantly, the procedure cannot be accu-
rately performed in the first stages of pregnancy.43 Results, therefore,
are not available until the second or third trimester. At this late stage,
genetic information puts a woman in a difficult quandary because her
options regarding her pregnancy are limited. Termination of preg-
nancy in the second and third trimester is not only subject to legal
restrictions, but late term abortion is also more psychologically and
physically traumatic than a first trimester abortion.' By the second
trimester the mother has felt the fetus moving inside her, and she has
likely seen the fetal image on an ultrasound.45 Additionally, the fetus
must actually be delivered to terminate the pregnancy.46 Alterna-
tively, if the mother decides to carry the pregnancy to term, she does
37. See id.
38. See id. at 31-32.
39. See id. at 32-35.
40. See id. at 32.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 12-15, 32-34.
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so knowing that her child will be affected to an unknown degree by a
genetic disorder. Neither of these choices is optimal.
In addition to drawbacks in timing, the procedure itself also
presents health risks to both the mother and fetus. Infection or mis-
carriage can result from insertion of the needle into the amniotic sac.47
Although such complications can usually be treated or avoided, the
risks should be carefully evaluated a.4  The potential for serious com-
plications is generally perceived as slim however, and amniocentesis is
commonly used in accessing prenatal health.49
4. Chorionic Villus Sampling
Chorionic villus sampling (CVS) can be performed earlier in the
pregnancy than amniocentesis, but again the procedure involves a sig-
nificant degree of maternal discomfort and invasiveness.5 ° The cho-
rion is the membrane surrounding the fetus that becomes the
placenta. The villi of the chorion (finger-like membranes) facilitate
the transfer of maternal and fetal blood.5 The chorion villi cells con-
tain the same genetic information as the fetus.52 A sample of the villi
is obtained either vaginally or through an incision in the mother's ab-
domen.53 The timing problem associated with amniocentesis is elimi-
nated because CVS provides results as early as the ninth week of
pregnancy.54 The risk of infection and miscarriage, however, is simi-
larly significant.55
5. Fetal Cell Sorting
Fetal cell sorting is the newest prenatal testing procedure.56 It is
currently experimental and not widely available.57 Fetal cell sorting
"sorts" a sample of maternal blood by subjecting it to a series of com-
plex procedures that separates traces of fetal blood from maternal
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 32-34 (stating that complications affecting the mother or fetus occur in
approximately one percent of the procedures).
50. See id. at 35-36.
51. See id.
52. See idL at 35.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 36.
55. See id.
56. See Telephone Interview with Kirk A. Keegan, Jr., M.D., supra note 34.
57. See L
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blood." The fetal blood is then tested for genetic disorders.5 9 Fetal
cell sorting does not present the risks of infection and miscarriage in-
herent in amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling, and sorting is sig-
nificantly less invasive and uncomfortable for the mother.6 0 There is,
however, some concern that because of its comparative ease, fetal cell
sorting may lend itself to use in less critical situations.6
D. Availability of Prenatal Genetic Testing
Prenatal genetic testing is not available to all pregnant women on
an equal basis. Many factors, most of which are out of her control,
affect whether or not a woman has access to testing. These factors
include whether a woman has access to and is undergoing regular pre-
natal care;62 whether she receives care from a public or private hospi-
tal or clinic; whether she has health insurance; whether her health
insurance provides coverage for genetic testing (and how such testing
might affect coverage); and her physician's personal convictions to-
wards prenatal genetic testing.
Where a woman lives in the United States also affects the availa-
bility of genetic testing.63 Women who live near medical and research
facilities that participate in the Human Genome Project, or similar
genetic studies, have access to cutting edge genetic technology that is
unavailable in technologically isolated areas.64 Also, physicians prac-
ticing in states that recognize wrongful life and wrongful birth suits are
more likely to offer mothers the option of genetic screening.65
1. Who Undergoes Prenatal Genetic Testing?
Whether a woman is offered prenatal genetic testing is dependent
entirely on her physician's assessment of her pregnancy and her physi-
cian's attitude towards testing. Initially, physicians offered prenatal
58. See Lori B. Andrews, Prenatal Screening and the Culture of Motherhood, 47 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 967, 970 (1996).
59. See id. at 970-71.
60. See id. at 972.
61. See id. at 972.
62. While recognizing that many women receive inadequate or nonexistent prenatal
care due to their social or economic status, this Note will nonetheless focus on those wo-
men who do receive regular prenatal care.
63. See Michael J. Malinowski, Coming Into Being: Law, Ethics, and the Practice of
Prenatal Genetic Screening, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1446 (1994).
64. See id.
65. See id. Malinowski cites New York as an example, stating "the fear of liability has
helped to inspire obstetricians to refer virtually all patients who are at any risk to genetic
counselors... [as a result] twenty-five thousand women in the state of New York are
screened for fetal genetic abnormalities each year." Id. at 1447.
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genetic testing only to women who were considered at risk of deliver-
ing babies with genetic disorders.66 Factors placing a women in the
high risk pregnancy category included being over the age of thirty-
five, having a family history of genetic disorders, or having an already
born child with a genetic disorder.67
The reoccurrence of a genetic disorder in a family's history is a
reasonable indication of risk. The selection of age thirty-five as the
fulcrum of risk analysis, however, is somewhat arbitrary.68 In Canada
and the United States, the age at which risk increased was initially set
at forty.69 In France, a woman is not considered at risk until she
reaches the age of thirty-eight.7 ° In reality, a woman's risk of giving
birth to a child with a genetic abnormality increases steadily as her age
increases. 71 A more accurate way to gauge an individual woman's risk
would be to evaluate the risks described above in conjunction with the
unique circumstances surrounding her pregnancy.
Today, prenatal genetic testing is offered as a routine component
of prenatal care irrespective of a woman's age or family history.72
Proponents of genetic testing argue that this approach respects a wo-
man's autonomy, enables her to make informed choices regarding her
pregnancy, and in most cases, provides reassurance that her pregnancy
is progressing normally.73 This argument of "control, choice, and re-
assurance" is appealing, however, other commentators have noted
several drawbacks.74 Some women may not feel the need for medical
reassurance. 75 Others argue that testing for certain disorders devalues
those individuals living with the conditions.76 Widespread testing in
general may be perceived as a blanket treatment that may not be ap-
propriate for all women in every circumstance.77
66. See NIGHTINGALE & GOODMAN, supra note 1, at 4-5.
67. See id.
68. See Abby Lippman, The Genetic Construction of Prenatal Testing: Choice, Consent,
or Conformity for Women?, in FACING T=E CHALLENGES, supra note 34, at 9, 16-17.
69. See id. at 17.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 16.
72. See Telephone Interview with Kirk A. Keegan, Jr., M.D., supra note 34.
73. See Lippman, supra note 68, at 14-15.
74. Il at 15.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 17. See also Deborah Kaplan, Prenatal Screening and Diagnosis: The
Impact on People with Disabilities, in FACING THE CHALLENGES, supra note 34, at 49.
77. See generally FACING THE CHALLENGES, supra note 34.
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2. Why Is Prenatal Genetic Testing Performed?
Physicians endorse prenatal genetic testing because, in the major-
ity of cases, it reassures the expectant mother that her fetus is healthy
and that her pregnancy is progressing normally.78 Testing can serve
other purposes as well. For example, a woman who decides to carry
her fetus to term can use the information provided by a positive test to
plan ahead.79 Arrangements can be made to give birth in a particular
hospital, with specialists and necessary equipment close at hand. Al-
ternatively, a woman may be uncertain as to whether or not she and
her family could cope financially, emotionally, or psychologically with
a disabled child. Prenatal testing can provide her with answers that
ease some uncertainty and enable her to exercise some control over
the situation.
m. Prenatal Genetic Testing: Not an End in Itseff
Prenatal genetic testing has been accurately described as "offer-
ing prospective parents difficult choices regarding the sacrifices they
are willing to make to be parents, what mental and physical character-
istics their children will have, and what kind of lives they want their
children to have at a time when abortion is still an option."80 It is
important to recall, however, that genetic tests are available for many
more disorders than is treatment for these disorders." As a result, in
many instances, a positive test result will not lead to treatment.
Rather, upon receiving a positive test result, a woman must decide
whether to continue or terminate her pregnancy. The availability of
fetal treatment, how such treatment would affect her, the woman's
feelings about abortion, and how she feels she could cope with a dis-
abled child are all issues that she should take into consideration when
deciding whether to seek or accept prenatal genetic testing.
A. Prenatal Genetic Testing and the Prevention of Disease
It is imperative to understand what is meant by disease preven-
tion. Genetic testing plays a role in disease prevention only when
treatment is available for the disorder in question. Terminating a
pregnancy to avoid delivering a child with a genetic disorder is not the
same as preventing or treating the disorder. Ruth Faden clearly ar-
78. See Telephone Interview with Kirk A. Keegan, Jr., M.D., supra note 34.
79. See id.
80. Malinowski, supra note 63, at 1478.
81. See Human Genome Project Information: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note
Winter 2000] COMPELLED PRENATAL GENETIC TESTING 407
ticulated this point, writing that "[e]liminating an incident of disease
or disability by 'preventing' the person who would have that disease
or disability from being born is not an instance of prevention-not in
the sense in which it is ordinarily meant and not as the term ought to
be used." 2 One must keep this important distinction in mind as pre-
natal genetic testing is evaluated as a means of disease prevention.
B. Prenatal Genetic Testing and the Treatment of Disease
If a genetic test reveals that a fetus is affected by a genetic disor-
der, then in an ideal scenario, the condition would be susceptible to in
utero treatment. Unfortunately, as noted already, often this is not the
case. Despite steady advancement, fetal treatment is in its infancy and
remains unavailable for the most commonly tested for conditions such
as, Downs syndrome, neural tube defects (such as anencephaly and
spina bifida), and cystic fibrosis. Thus, in many cases a positive test
result leads to termination of the pregnancy.
1. Available Treatment
Fetal surgery and fetal gene therapy enables physicians to inter-
vene before birth to correct a fetal genetic disorder. Neither proce-
dure is currently routine. Both involve significant risks to the mother
and fetus.
Fetal surgery corrects the manifestation rather than the presence
genetic disorders. Initially, fetal surgery was relatively simple. First
performed in the early 1980s, the procedure involved inserting a nee-
dle through the mother's abdomen and into the fetus to drain the fetal
urinary tract.8 3 Recent advances in medical technology have drasti-
cally expanded fetal surgical capabilities. Today, the fetus can be re-
moved from the womb, undergo major surgery, and then be returned
to the womb to continue its gestation.s4 Clearly, this kind of fetal sur-
gery entails major, invasive surgery for the mother. Whether she is
willing to take this kind of risk on behalf of her fetus will be addressed
below.
Fetal gene therapy is still in experimental stages. Gene therapy
attempts to correct the fetal genetic defect before birth by directly
82. Ruth Faden, Reproductive Genetic Testing, Prevention and the Ethics of Mothering,
in FACING THE CHALLENGES, supra note 34, at 88, 92.
83. See Scott R. DeBonis, The Fetal-Maternal Conflict: Judicial Resolution Based Upon
Constitutional Rights, 22 Omo N.U. L. RFv. 479, 482 (1995).
84. See id. at 483.
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manipulating the associated genes.85 A researcher in Southern Cali-
fornia has petitioned the National Institute of Health for permission
to begin experiments in which he intends to replace defective genes
with a copy of a functioning gene, thus preventing, or at least partially
correcting, the defect.86 One of the risks involved with this kind of
direct intervention is that the genetic manipulation could affect the
fetus' reproductive genes, thereby affecting future generations.87 Al-
though human tests are still some years away, the ethics committee of
the National Institute of Health has already begun to evaluate the po-
tential risks and benefits of this kind of direct genetic interference.
88
In addition to the invasive intervention of fetal surgery and ge-
netic therapy, it is conceivable that some forms of prenatal treatment
may cause less inconvenience or discomfort to a pregnant woman.
Perhaps as yet undiscovered oral medication, vitamins, or dietary sup-
plements could reverse or minimize the effects of a genetic disorder.
When, and if, such simple treatment becomes available, it will create
yet another wrinkle in the debate over prenatal genetic testing.
Procedures to intervene and correct fetal genetic defects will
surely continue to develop and become more widely available. In all
likelihood, they will entail progressively less discomfort to the preg-
nant woman. Currently however, surgical intervention on behalf of a
fetus requires a significant invasion of a woman's bodily integrity, and
puts her health at risk. Inevitably, there will be instances when a wo-
man will be reluctant or even unwilling to undergo treatment on be-
half of her fetus. This dilemma is the subject of the following
discussion.
2. What Resulting Obligation to Undergo Treatment?
When a prenatal genetic test is returned with a positive result,
and treatment is available to cure or ameliorate the affects, what
then? Does the mother have an ensuing obligation to undergo
whatever treatment is deemed necessary by her physician? In most
instances the expectant mother will do whatever is necessary to assure
the health of her fetus.89 This behavior is an example of the principle
of beneficence, which is concerned with "conferring benefits or seek-
85. See Jennifer Couzin, RAC Confronts in Utero Gene Therapy Proposals, ScIEcN,




89. See Telephone Interview with Kirk A. Keegan, Jr., M.D., supra note 34.
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ing the best interests of others." 90 Women generally act with benefi-
cence towards the fetus they carry, and are genuinely interested in
doing all they can to successfully carry a healthy baby to term. Unfor-
tunately, this principle does not always prevail, as illustrated by the
growing number of infants who are born addicted to drugs or ad-
versely affected by alcohol.91
But what if a woman chooses not to undergo the prescribed treat-
ment because her religious convictions prevent her from doing so? 92
What if she is terrified of invasive surgery or seeks to avoid risk? 93
What if she fears having to raise a child who is saved by fetal surgery,
but is still severely handicapped? 94 Regardless of her reason, an ex-
pectant mother who declines beneficial treatment on behalf of her fe-
tus will, at a minimum, be subjected to intense scrutiny and moral
condemnation.95 This conflict is known as the fetal-maternal con-
flict.96 Fetal-maternal conflict arises in other situations, namely in the
context of forced caesarean cases, which will be discussed below in
Section IV.
C. Prenatal Genetic Testing and Abortion
Since there is no treatment for most of the genetic conditions for
which tests are conducted, women who undergo prenatal genetic test-
ing have two choices when faced with a positive test result. Either
they can carry the pregnancy to term, knowing that their child will be
affected by a genetic disorder, or they can terminate their pregnancy.
In light of this fact, it is surprising that prenatal genetic testing has
been met with such widespread acceptance. 97 Limited only by the am-
biguous "undue burden" standard formulated by the Supreme Court's
1992 decision, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,98 states are steadily chip-
ping away at the accessibility of abortion. Many states allow late term
abortions only when the mother's life is in danger, yet often results of
90. Faden, supra note 82, at 90.
91. See Telephone Interview with Kirk A. Keegan Jr., M.D., supra note 34. Dr. Kee-
gan noted that one in ten infants born in New York is affected by drugs.
92. See Katherine A. Knopoff, Can a Pregnant Woman Morally Refuse Fetal Surgery?,
79 CAt. L. REv. 499, 502 (1991).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See DeBonis, supra note 83, at 479-80.
96. See id.
97. See Telephone Interview with Kirk A. Keegan, Jr., M.D., supra note 34. See also
Andrews, supra note 58, at 1001-02.
98. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
410 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27:397
prenatal genetic tests are not available until the second trimester,
when state limitations begin to take effect.
Ironically, many states have laws regulating abortion and genetic
testing which are at odds with one another.99 For example, soon after
Louisiana established regional genetics clinics, legislation was passed
that prohibited abortion of fetuses diagnosed with genetic disor-
ders.100 Tennessee passed a law which forbid the use of public funds
for prenatal diagnosis unless there was effective treatment, finding
that abortion was against public policy. Four years later, the Tennes-
see legislature reversed itself, and provided public funds for "abor-
tions of fetuses 'medically determined to have severe physical
deformities or abnormalities or severe mental retardation."1 01
Adding to the confusion are health insurance companies, which
unfortunately play an unwanted role in women's decision making pro-
cess. One chilling example involved a woman whose existing child
had cystic fibrosis.'02 She was pregnant with a second child and
sought prenatal testing for the condition.10 3 After a positive result,
she carried the child to term. Her HMO, which had paid for the test-
ing, subsequently notified her that it would not provide health insur-
ance for the baby because it was born with a preexisting condition. 04
Although the HMO eventually capitulated, its initial decision raises
the question of whether such a policy might be acceptable in the
future.105
Prenatal genetic testing often leads to abortion when treatment is
nonexistent. 0 6 Unless states assist families with children affected by
genetic disorders or provide other alternatives, it is inconsistent for
states to simultaneously discourage abortion and encourage prenatal
genetic testing. To better serve women and send a consistent message,
lawmakers must reconcile abortion law with prenatal testing
regulations.
99. See Ellen Wright Clayton, What the Law Says About Reproductive Genetic Testing
and What It Doesn't, in FACING ThE CHALLENGES, supra note 34, at 131, 147-50. See also
Julia Walsh, Reproductive Rights and the Human Genome Project, 4 S. CAL. L. REv. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 145, 159 (1994).
100. See Clayton, supra note 99, at 147-50.
101. Ik. at 147-48 (citation omitted).
102. See Elena Gates, Prenatal Genetic Testing: Does It Benefit Pregnant Women?, in




106. See Andrews, supra note 58, at 1002.
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IV. Grounds on Which to Advocate Mandatory
Prenatal Testing
The advances in genetic technology, the availability of treatment
for some detected genetic disorders, and the increased acceptance of
prenatal genetic testing, leads one to ask whether a woman could ever
be compelled to undergo prenatal genetic testing, or whether a state
could mandate prenatal genetic screening for certain conditions.
These questions expose a tension between states' interests and the
rights of individuals. On one side, the Tenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution grants broad authority to states, stating "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple."' 7 States' Tenth Amendment police power includes the author-
ity to regulate in the interest of public health and welfare.10 8 On the
other side, the Constitution guarantees citizens a number of rights and
liberties, among them, a right to privacy, freedom from search and
seizure, and protection of bodily integrity.109 After the following eval-
uation, it is clear that a pregnant woman's rights in this area outweigh
those of the state, and that courts would reject compelled prenatal
genetic testing.
A. Utilization of State Police Power to Regulate Prenatal Genetic
Testing in the Interest of Public Health and Welfare
State authority to regulate public health and welfare under the
police power was recognized by the Supreme Court in Jacobson v.
Massachusetts." In Jacobson, the Court interpreted state power
broadly and upheld a Massachusetts statute which mandated smallpox
vaccination."' It stated that the courts' role is not to consider
whether the method of regulation is the best method to achieve the
107. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
108. The U.S. Supreme Court described the States' power to regulate the public health
as the power to "enact quarantine laws and 'health laws of every description."' Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (quoting Gibbon v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203
(1824)).
109. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV (right to privacy); U.S. CoNsT. amend IV (freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures); and Christyne L. Neff, Woman, Womb, and
Bodily Integrity, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 327,337 (1991) (finding support for the principle
of bodily integrity in common law as well judicial interpretation of the First, Fourth, Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution).
110. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
111. See id. at 28.
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desired means, but solely whether it is reasonably related to the state's
objective.
11 2
In the years following Jacobson, states initiated many public
health programs. Most of these programs mandated vaccinations
and quarantines directed at preventing the spread of communicable
diseases.'1 4 Courts usually endorsed mandatory vaccination and quar-
antine despite the fact that they infringed on individual rights, citing
Jacobson for the proposition that a state may "enact... health laws of
every description so long as they are not unreasonable, arbitrary or
oppressive." ' 5 In the 1960s and 1970s, however, courts began to rec-
ognize limitations on a state's authority.
1 16
In 1975, the Supreme Court held that a state's interest in protect-
ing public health did not outweigh a mental patient's liberty interest,
finding that mental illness alone did not justify involuntary confine-
ment.'1 More recently, states' response to the increasing prevalence
of HIV and AIDS contributed to courts' change in policy."" More
importantly, courts began to recognize the applicability of a strict
scrutiny standard of review. 1 9 When a state passes legislation that
infringes on individual rights, the strict scrutiny standard requires the
state to show that the chosen restriction is the least intrusive means to
realize a compelling state interest. 20 Thus, to justify mandatory pre-
natal genetic testing, a state must show that testing is the least intru-
sive means of addressing some compelling state interest. What are the
compelling interests that would be served by mandated prenatal ge-
netic testing? The most persuasive are a state's interest in preventing
disease and in protecting potential life.
1. Whether States Have a Compelling Interest in Preventing Disease
A state might make a persuasive argument that it has a compel-
ling interest in preventing disease.' 2 ' As one commentator has noted,
"[f]oreknowledge of risk presents the opportunity for close monitor-
112. See id. at 25, 35.
113. See Kristin M. Raffone, Note, The Human Genome Project: Genetic Screening and
the Fundamental Right of Privacy, 26 HoFsRA L. REv. 503, 520-22 (1997).
114. See id.
115. Id. at 521 (quoting Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25).
116. See id. at 522.
117. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
118. See Raffone, supra note 113, at 524-29.
119. See id. at 523.
120. See id. at 539.
121. See id.
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ing, early diagnosis, and curative intervention. ' 122 Early detection en-
ables physicians to offer treatment at an earlier date, with the aim of
alleviating or mitigating the symptoms of a genetic disorder. Alterna-
tively, a positive test result for a devastating disorder provides women
and their families with information, enabling them to make informed
family planning decisions. Many states have already implemented ge-
netic testing of newborns as a preventative measure for certain condi-
tions.'3 Neonatal genetic testing could potentially serve as a
precedent on which to base prenatal testing if appropriate parallels
could be draw.
California, for example, has mandated neonatal genetic screening
for phenylketonuria (PKU).124 California Health and Safety Code:
Genetic Prevention Service Hereditary Disorders Act section
124980(f) states in part, "[n]o testing, except initial screening for PKU
and other diseases that may be added to the newborn screening pro-
gram, shall require mandatory participation."'" Genetic tests for
PKU are highly determinative and reliable because it is a single-gene
disorder. 2 6 Left untreated, PKU interferes with the development of
brain cells and causes mental retardation. 27 Treatment for the condi-
tion consists of strict dietary control for the first ten years of life.12
Assuming that a state's interest in preventing PKU is compelling,
one next asks whether genetic testing is the least intrusive method of
prevention. In order to test for PKU, the infant's heel is pricked to
obtain a blood sample. A highly reliable blood test is performed and
treatment is available for the condition if the test is positive. 29 PKU
is a unique and perfect instance wherein there is both an accurate test
and a relatively simple treatment. 30 The question becomes more
complex when one recalls that treatment is nonexistent for the major-
ity of conditions for which genetic tests are available. Additional
questions are raised when one considers that genetic tests are availa-
ble for adult onset diseases, as well as for non-lethal diseases. Is it
appropriate to mandate prenatal genetic testing for these disorders?
122. See id. at 540 (quoting Philip R. Reilly, Public Policy and Legal Issues Raised by
Advances in Genetic Screening and Testing, 27 SuFFOLK U. L. REv. 1327, 1333 (1993)).
123. See id.; see also NIGHTENGALE & GOODMAN, supra note 1, at 91.
124. See Raffone, supra note 113, at 540.
125. CAL. HEALTI & SAFETY CODE § 124980(f) (Deering 1999).
126. See Raffone, supra note 113, at 540 n. 199.
127. See NIGHTINGALE & GOODMAN, supra note 1, at 16.
128. See idL at 25.
129. See Raffone, supra note 113, at 540; see also NIGHTINGALE & GOODMAN, supra
note 1, at 91.
130. See id.
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2. Whether States Have a Compelling Interest in Protecting Potential
Life
A state might also argue that prenatal genetic testing furthers its
compelling interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus. Such a
right has been recognized by the Supreme Court.' 3' In Roe v. Wade,
the Court recognized a woman's right to have an abortion.132 The
Court also found, however, that the state had an "important and legit-
imate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. '13 3 In his
majority opinion, Justice Blackmun constructed a trimester frame-
work with which to balance a woman's rights against those of the
state.13  Blackmun's trimester framework was overturned in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey because it "undervalue[d] the State's interest in
potential life."' 3 5 States have relied on this language in Casey to place
increasing restrictions on the availability of abortion. In several unset-
tling cases in which a woman was subjected to court ordered treat-
ment on behalf of her fetus, states have again attempted to further
their interest in protecting potential life.'36
In Re A.C. is a well known case in which a terminally ill woman
was forced to undergo a caesarean section, over her objection, to de-
liver her twenty-six and a half week old fetus. 37 The baby girl died
two and a half hours after the operation was performed.138 The
mother died two days later.139 The court of appeal, in its decision to
overturn the order, carefully noted two points.140 First, the trial judge
had been under a tremendous time constraint and had not had the
opportunity to deliberate or effectively evaluate the legal issues
presented.' 4' Second, the court stated that although both mother and
baby had died after the surgery, the case was not moot because "col-
131. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
132. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 163-64.
135. Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.
136. See In Re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County
Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981) (ordering a caesarean section against the mother's
expressed wishes to deliver a thirty nine week old fetus); see also In Re A.C., 573 A.2d
1235, 1243 (D.C. 1990) (citing a survey which found thirteen out of fifteen attempts in the
previous five years to acquire court authorization for caesarean interventions succeeded).
137. In Re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987).
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See In Re A.C. 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. 1990).
141. See id.
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lateral consequences will flow from any decision we make in this
appeal."' 42
The court of appeal overturned the court-ordered caesarean
based on the theory of informed consent and the concept of bodily
integrity.143 In determining A.C.'s interest in retaining her constitu-
tionally protected right to bodily integrity, the court considered the
decision of a Pennsylvania court in McFall v. Shimp.1' In McFall, the
court refused to order a man to donate bone marrow essential to save
his cousin's life.'45 The A.C. court approved the following language
from McFall:
The common law has consistently held to a rule which provides
that one human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid
or to take action to save another human being or to rescue ....
For our law to compel defendant to submit to an intrusion of his
body would change every concept and principle upon which our
society is founded. To do so would defeat the sanctity of the
individual, and would impose a rule which would know no limit,
and one could not imagine where the line would be drawn.
146
Additionally, the A. C. court acknowledged and rejected the argu-
ment that a mother's duty towards her fetus might be higher than one
citizen's duty towards another, stating that:
It has been suggested that fetal cases are different because a
woman who "has chosen to lend her body to bring [a] child into
the world" has an enhanced duty to assure the welfare of the
fetus, sufficient even to require her to undergo caesarean sur-
gery. Surely, however, a fetus cannot have rights in this respect
superior to those of a person who has already been born.' 4 '
After reviewing the McFall decision, and other compelled caesa-
rean cases, the A. C. court held that:
[E]very person has the right, under the common law and the
Constitution, to accept or refuse medical treatment. This right
of bodily integrity belongs equally to persons who are compe-
tent and persons who are not .... To protect that right against
intrusion by others-family members, doctors, hospitals, or any-
one else, however well-intentioned-we hold that a court must
determine the patient's wishes by any means available, and must
142. Id. at 1241.
143. See id. at 1243.
144. See id. at 1244; McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978).
145. See McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 92.
146. A.C., 573 A.2d at 1243 (quoting McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 91) (emphasis in
original)).
147. Id. at 1244 (citing John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Con-
traception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. Rav. 405, 456 (1983) (footnote omitted)).
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abide by those wishes unless there are truly extraordinary or
compelling reasons to override them.
148
As a general rule, court-ordered caesareans have been over-
turned on appeal because the courts of appeal "properly based their
decisions upon the constitutional issues involved [since] attorneys and
courts are not confronted with the time constraints facing the lower
court. ' 149 As illustrated by the court of appeal's decision in In Re
A.C., a state's interest in protecting potential life does not presump-
tively trump women's rights. A state must show that the mandated
action furthers a compelling state interest. Although protecting po-
tential life arguably may be such a compelling interest, prenatal ge-
netic testing does not further that objective. Since treatment is
nonexistent for many conditions, a positive test result often leads to
termination of the pregnancy. Clearly ending a pregnancy is inappo-
site to protecting potential life.
B. Policy Arguments Fail to Support Mandated Prenatal Genetic
Testing
1. Philosophical Approach
A state may attempt to appeal to public sensibilities to "sell" the
idea of prenatal genetic testing. One argument in this vein utilizes a
utilitarian approach. This approach advocates the greatest happiness
for the greatest number of people. 5 ° "In a utilitarian analysis, the
appropriate method of determining the best outcome involves the bal-
ancing of risks against benefits, disadvantages against advantages,
pain against pleasure. Utilitarianism requires following the course of
action that leads to the best possible outcome, and the ends are per-
mitted to justify the means.'
15 '
A Utilitarian would argue that compelling a woman to undergo
unwanted prenatal testing is justified, despite the fact that her rights
would be violated, because testing results in a greater good. Prenatal
genetic testing provides benefits in two ways. The fetus could be
treated, benefiting the fetus who will be unaffected by the abnormal
genetic condition, as well as society, which gains a healthy member.
Alternatively, some would contend that the fetus could be aborted,
148. Id. at 1247 (citing In Re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972)). The court then
continued its analysis and discussed substituted judgment. It determined that the applica-
tion of substituted judgment would also have upheld A.C.'s desire not to undergo a caesa-
rean section. See id.
149. DeBonis, supra note 83, at 493.
150. See Knopoff, supra note 92, at 505.
151. Id.
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thereby saving society from the burden of caring for and supporting a
potentially dependent child and sparing the fetus from living with a
genetic disability.
When the utilitarian approach is extended to other public health
issues however, it quickly becomes apparent that it produces unac-
ceptable results. For example, applied to the organ donor program,
the utilitarian approach would permit a healthy person to be put to
death so that her organs could be donated to save the lives of at least
two other people. Although the greater good would be served, no one
would choose to live by this rule. 52 A state would have a difficult time
persuading the public to embrace utilitarianism. There is, however, an
alternative philosophical approach.
Deontology rejects the idea that the ends justifies the means.
From the deontological perspective, every action is either inherently
right or wrong.'53 "Deontology requires following the course of ac-
tion that involves only right acts, never compromising rights or duties
for the sake of outcome."'5 4 Deontology forms the foundation on
which the doctrine of informed consent is based.' 5 5 Also, deontology
goes hand in hand with the court of appeal's decision in In Re A.C..
Finally, it is more in sync with society's values and individuals' rights.
Deontology does not support state mandated prenatal genetic screen-
ing. It does, however, provide a foundation for a voluntary testing
alternative.
2. Legal Liability
A state could make a legal argument that mandated prenatal ge-
netic testing protects healthcare providers from potential liability. As
noted previously, several states, including New York, have recognized
wrongful life and wrongful birth claims. 6 The availability of these
claims pressures physicians to encourage testing when in fact it may
not be indicated.
Again the states' argument fails. A physician need only docu-
ment that she discussed prenatal testing options with the expectant
mother. Once she has done so, the woman can initiate testing if
desires. The doctrine of informed consent works in this instance to
152. See id. at 505-06.
153. See id.
154. I
155. See id. at 507.
156. See Malinowski, supra note 63, at 1447.
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protect the physiciAn from liability and to encourage the exchange of
information between physician and patient.
V. Arguments in Favor of Prenatal Genetic Testing Are
Unconvincing Because Women Do Not Give Up
Fundamental Rights Upon
Becoming Pregnant
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has recognized that
states have an interest in protecting potential life and in preventing
disease.157 However, under the strict scrutiny standard, states must
also show that prenatal testing is the least intrusive means of further-
ing those interests. 5 ' Since there are alternatives which better ad-
vance state interests, and because prenatal genetic testing
unnecessarily infringes upon several of women's fundamental rights,
mandated testing would not be upheld by courts.
A. State Authority to Regulate in the Interest of Public Health and
Welfare Does Not Outweigh Women's Constitutional
Rights Under the Strict Scrutiny Standard
Several fundamental rights would be infringed upon if a state
were to mandate prenatal genetic testing. The right to privacy, protec-
tion from unreasonable searches and seizures, protection of bodily in-
tegrity, and rights under the equal protection clause would all be
violated. A statute creating such a mandate would be subjected to
strict scrutiny by the courts. Upon judicial evaluation, the statute
would fail.
The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. 59 This right includes the
right to make autonomous personal decisions related to contracep-
tion, marriage, and procreation. 60 Justice O'Connor, in her concur-
ring opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg,161 stated that "[w]hatever
the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty may be, it defi-
nitely includes protection for matters central to personal dignity and
157. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 63-64 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 873 (1992).
158. See Raffone, supra note 113, at 539.
159. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a "penumbra" of
privacy rights within the Fourteenth Amendment).
160. See Raffone, supra note 113, at 536 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
480 (1965); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117-18
(1973)).
161. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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autonomy."" 62 Mandatory prenatal testing provides private informa-
tion not only to the woman and her family, but also to her physician,
and conceivably her health insurance carrier and employer.163 Also,
mandatory testing fails to recognize that a woman has a right not to
know the results of the test.164 A woman's right to privacy ensures
that she has control over this kind of information. Mandatory testing
would strip that control away.
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures.165 It states that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures, shall not be violated."'16 6 As one commen-
tator has noted, "[t]he Fourth Amendment provides an arena for
direct confrontation between the government's interest in law en-
forcement and the individual's interest in bodily integrity."' 67 The Su-
preme Court has held that mandatory testing "plainly involves the
broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.'
'1 68
A pregnant woman's interest in protecting her bodily integrity is
also threatened by state mandated prenatal genetic testing.169 This
principle has its roots in common law, and has found judicial support
in the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 70 "No right
is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable power of law."'' The Court utilizes a bal-
ancing test to weigh an individual's interest in bodily integrity against
competing state interests in protecting public health under the police
powers.' 72 Courts look to the depth of the intrusion, whether the in-
trusion is routine and reliable, and whether it is "shocking."' 7 3
162 Id. at 2307 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
163. See Andrews, supra note 58, at 996; see also Raffone, supra note 113, at 550-53.
164. See Andrews, supra note 58, at 997.
165. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
166 Id.
167. Neff, supra note 109, at 344-45.
168. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
169. See Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
170. See Neff, supra note 109, at 338.
171. Id. at 337.
172. See Raffone, supra note 113, at 530.
173. See Neff, supra note 109, at 345.
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The Supreme Court has approved urine and blood testing of
transportation employees in the interest of protecting public safety. 74
Mandatory HIV testing for prisoners has also been approved by
courts.'7 Clearly, these cases are easily distinguishable from man-
dated prenatal genetic testing. The risks posed by inebriated trans-
portation workers and communicable diseases are in no way similar to
the risks addressed by genetic testing.'76
Finally, mandatory prenatal testing singles out pregnant women.
It subjects them to intrusive medical testing that no man or non-
pregnant woman would ever experience. Thus, a greater burden is
placed on women with respect to procreation. 7 7 This kind of discrim-
inatory treatment is prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause and
is subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.'78 This means that pre-
natal genetic testing must "serve important government objectives
and be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."'1 79
Although the state can make a plausible argument that it has an im-
portant interests, as noted above, those interests are not furthered by
prenatal testing.
B. Policy Arguments Against Mandated Prenatal Genetic Testing
Aside from the Constitutional issues addressed above, there are
additional arguments against mandated prenatal genetic testing. First,
genetic diversity is threatened by mandatory testing. 80 For example,
in the 1970s some states initiated mandatory screening for sickle cell
anemia because it was perceived as a "debilitating and undesirable
genetic defect."' 8 Years later it was determined that the gene that
triggers sickle cell anemia also causes immunity to malaria. 82 As this
case plainly illustrates, eradicating genetic differences without a com-
plete understanding of their potential benefits can be a dangerous
gamble with potentially serious consequences.
174. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
175. See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989).
176. See Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461, 464
(8th Cir. 1989) (enjoining mandatory HIV testing of employees as an unreasonable search
and seizure because it violated employee's privacy interests).
177. See Walsh, supra note 99, at 164.
178. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
179. Id
180. See Raffone, supra note 113, at 546.
181. Id. at 547.
182. See id.
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One should also understand that a woman who wishes to avoid
prenatal testing is likely to avoid prenatal care entirely if testing is a
mandatory component. Prenatal care is too important to risk alienat-
ing pregnant women who, for whatever reasons, do not wish to know
genetic information about their fetus or themselves. Also, testing for
genetic disorders, particularly those that are non-lethal, may devalue
individuals who are living with the conditions. Further, disparities be-
tween women with access to prenatal care and those without will be-
come even greater. Women with access to care will likely have fewer
children with genetic disorders, making it all the more likely that ge-
netic disorders will be relegated to less privileged citizens.
Finally, and most importantly, one must keep in mind that in all
but the most unusual circumstances, women will take whatever steps
necessary to ensure their baby's health and well-being. Women gener-
ally act with beneficence towards the fetus they carry and are sincerely
interested in doing all they can to successfully carry a healthy baby to
term. This principle is the basis on which a voluntary genetic testing
program will succeed.
VI. Conclusion
Although states have an interest in protecting the public's health
and welfare, that interest does not supersede the right of pregnant
women to be free from unwanted prenatal genetic testing. As an al-
ternative, states should encourage physicians to offer women and their
families information about testing and allow them to make informed
choices. Several important points should be made in providing infor-
mation, including the types of tests available, the reliability of the
tests, the availability of treatment, and the alternatives to treatment.
It is important that testing is offered as an alternative, not as a
mandatory component of prenatal care. Paternalistic intervention by
the state is unwarranted, as well as unconstitutional. The principles of
beneficence and autonomy can be relied on to protect potential life,
while at the same time respecting the rights of pregnant women.
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